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only these. Logic teaches—the former through the perfect determination of the Comprehensions of Reason, and the latter through its being a science of Method. Hence Logic is *Philosophia Prima*, the true one. Hegel's definition of Logic—it is the science of the Idea in the abstract elements of Thinking asserts that it considers the Truth (not merely its abstract form) but how it shapes itself in abstract thought—hence not as intuited (Nature) nor as self-conscious (Spirit). With the word *Begriff*, which he takes in the wide sense that he gives to it as title of the third part, he means: *the internal self-active nature, or the essence which impels itself into Being; hence that which he calls also SUBJECT or SUBJECTIVITY.*"

THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE PRESENT TIME.

By E. VON HARTMANN.

[The following article, sent to this Journal by Dr. Hartmann of Berlin, gives a compendious view of the position taken by that Professor in a series of treatises—some published as articles in the (Berlin) *Philosophische Monatshefte*; others as books: *Ueber die dialektische Methode*, and *Philosophie des Unbewussten*. We have in hand a short article on the latter named book, prepared for this Journal by Dr. Ernst Kapp of Düsseldorf, which we propose to give our readers in the next number. Differing as widely as we do from some of the views expressed in the following article, we cannot but venture our opinion that Goethe's apostrophe to America,

"Du hast es besser
Als unser Continent,"

applies with force to our conceptions of the systems of Philosophers. For we are obliged to gain our knowledge of such systems from the original works themselves, whereas in Germany the student hears and adopts from the mouth of the professor the traditional version of those doctrines. Otherwise it is unaccountable to us how any one can read Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts* and *Philosophie der Geschichte*, and still suppose him to neglect the Will as real principle. But against that *traditional* Hegelianism we must concede that Schopenhauer is a most excellent prophylactic, and that Professor Von Hartmann has undertaken a valuable labor.—We are indebted to Mr. Davidson for the translation from the German original.—EDITOR.]

In Spinoza's monism, and Leibnitz's Monadology, idealism and realism are still undifferentiated; they have not yet been separated or recognized in their antithesis by the consciousness. If the Anglo-French philosophy isolated and developed realism, the side of idealism fell mainly into the hands of German philosophy. However, in order to raise idealism, which lies much farther from the common understanding than realism, to a complete system, three steps were

necessary, (1) subjective idealism, (2) objective idealism, (3) absolute idealism. After Kant had laid the critical basis of idealism, Fichte developed upon these the system of subjective idealism; Schelling not only supplemented this by the objective idealism of the Nature-philosophy, but he distinctly affirmed that the two were mere sides of the one full and complete (absolute) idealism, or of the system of pure reason (Panlogism), which latter Hegel worked out in all directions. When, however, the development had arrived at this point, the reaction in favor of the neglected Realism began at once to show itself in Schopenhauer (1818), after Schelling had already (in 1809) broken in principle with Panlogism. Schopenhauer ignored the, to him, unintelligible developments since Fichte, and the necessary step which subjective idealism had taken in him, in that it showed that the Kantian "Thing-in-itself" or the Non-Ego could be nothing other than something posited by the Ego; and without repudiating the Kantian form of subjective idealism, which he even amalgamated with French materialism, he set up the principle of all reality which had been entirely neglected by Hegel—namely, the Will—as the corner-stone of his system, declaring: "The thing in itself, the intelligible essence of the world, is will," the only thing which according to Schelling is the ground of reality.

Hereupon Schelling produced his famous Critique of Absolute Idealism, which refuted it, and set up in opposition to it a demand for a positive philosophy. He showed that absolute idealism can only say: *If* anything is, it must be in such a manner; but that it cannot say *that* anything is in such a manner; moreover, he united Hegel's Logical Idea and Schopenhauer's Will as co-ordinate principles, and removed, once for all, the possibility of any relapse into subjective idealism by exposing the fundamental error of Kant's *Critique*, which consists in this: that from the proved *a priori* nature of time and space as forms of subjective intuition, the unjustifiable conclusion is drawn that these cannot at the same time be *a priori* forms of existence. When space and time are restored to their rank as *a priori* forms of being, the transcendental reality of nature and history is again invested with its rights.

In opposition to this entire development, which moves in the sphere of monism, Herbart comes forward with his pluralistic individualism, and in this sense stands related to the former as Leibnitz does to Spinoza. He rejects monism, because in all its forms, so far, it has been unable to render individuality conceivable, and the individual is shorn of his rights. So considered, he forms a complement to monism such as history demands and justifies. It must therefore be the task of any system of philosophy at the present time to imitate the later Schelling in uniting in itself the principles of Hegel and Schopenhauer, and to assign to the individual, within the limits of monism, the place that belongs to him, as well as to explain individualization. Finally, it must be able organically to unite the pessimism which follows from a philosophy of blind will (Schopenhauer) with the optimism (Hegel) which results from a philosophy of the rational idea, without taking off the edge of the antithesis. Thus the metaphysical material for a system of philosophy at the present time is essentially prescribed by the historical development of philosophy; the only question remaining is: What will its philosophical method have to be?

We have to choose between the dialectic, the deductive, and the inductive methods. The dialectic method (according to Hegel) cancels in the first place the axiom of identity, according to which *A* must always be only *A*, and can never be *not-A*; and affirms that *A* is in a flux, and may be *A* and likewise *not-A*. On this principle all reliable standard for thinking disappears, inasmuch as the measure is no less in a flux than the thing to be measured; for example, by the flux of the middle term, the syllogism, which presupposes the identity of the middle term in the major and minor premises, is rendered impossible. Secondly, again, the dialectic lays down contradiction as something everywhere and necessarily existing, as something that must be everywhere and necessarily thought, and the identity of contradictions as the truth. With this cancelling of the principle of contradiction, all formal criteria of truth vanish, all possibility of a *reductio ad absurdum*, and indeed all possibility of discussion vanishes. One part of the Hegelian school inconsequently labors to avoid the cancelling of the principle of contradiction, but by

so doing renders the dialectic method incapable of life. Thirdly, dialectic progress is as little possible through the unity of opposites as the identity of contradictionaries ; for, apart from the fact that all concepts do not by any means have contrary opposites (only such can be considered here), the uniting of two contrary opposites never gives anything else but the zero of the genus in question (e. g. a red and green ray of light, when united, produce a colorless light). Thus the dialectic method cannot, under any circumstances, lead to new results ; but at best, if it is rightly understood, to the critical sifting of already existing views—the purpose for which Aristotle uses it. As concerns the deductive method, again, everything (according to Aristotle) is deducible save the principles. The principles, however, may be given in three ways : either by formal certainty, in which case they are only of a formal kind, and from the merely formal it is impossible to arrive at any material content; or by mystic intuition—this, however, is something individual, and cannot therefore ever be a basis for objective science ; or finally by the inductive method, in which case deduction is superfluous, inasmuch as it would merely repeat that which was already reached by induction. It thus appears that the inductive method is the only one remaining which is capable of bringing to light material truths, and at the same time placing them upon a scientific foundation. Besides, deduction recommends itself for other reasons to philosophy at the present time. It is to it that recent times owe their enormous progress in all branches of science, and it is it, therefore, that would be best calculated, as far as method is concerned, to bring philosophy into connection with the efforts of the present time. Moreover, even in a material point of view, it affords the best opportunity of bringing about an entire reconciliation between empiricism and speculative philosophy, of spiritualizing and unifying the empirical sciences by means of speculation, and of enriching philosophy, through the treasures of modern science, with an abundance of important and interesting material. The broader the empirical basis, the surer and richer will be the results of induction. As, at all times, philosophy has had its root principally in what formed the main spiritual interests of the different periods, so, at the present

time, it must have its roots mainly in natural science and history; then and only then has it a right to hope that it will regain that interest on the part of the educated public which it has lost.

IS THOUGHT THE THINKER?

To the Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

MY DEAR SIR:—Allow me to draw your attention to a proposition in Philosophy of vast importance, which has as yet had no discussion nor the least attempt at justification upon the part of those who put it forward, and who only thus quietly assume its truth as a mere matter of course. The proposition I allude to is this:—Thinking is that which thinks. Perceiving is the Percipient. Action is, in all cases, the only Agent. “*Das Denken*,” says Hegel, “*ist das Ich*.” The same thing is also otherwise expressed by saying that there is nothing existing except things whose *esse* is *percipi*—the things commonly, in Metaphysics, called Phenomena. This tenet which was originally put forward by David Hume for the obvious purpose of turning all Metaphysics into ridicule, especially the doctrine that had been recently taught with so much success by Berkeley, had to some little extent the desired effect in England, Scotland and Ireland among the less speculative portion of the educated. Even now we have occasionally a History of Speculative Philosophy to show that there can be no such thing at all as Speculative Philosophy, and a criticism of Berkeley’s doctrine to show, without a blush, that the critic could see no sense in it. The fate of Hume’s supposed metaphysical tenet, however, in Germany was very different. It there, indeed, effectually obstructed Berkeley’s reputation for nearly a whole century even among the metaphysicians of that country. But it did not obstruct metaphysical research, nor did it even obstruct the progress of Berkeley’s *doctrine* there. On the contrary, it was under the influence of Hume’s silly tenet that metaphysical research, involving the phenomenal nature of matter, has had its bright career in Germany. It was under its influence that this began at Königsberg and ended at Berlin. Kant gravely rejected Hume’s jest, and Hegel as gravely accepted it with all the